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Abstract: Agricultural trade policies between Turkey and the European Union are modeled using a political preference function
(PPF). The PPF is used to estimate the producer and consumer weights perceived by policy makers. The agricultural effects of
Turkey’s integration into the European Union (EU) and optimal strategies for Turkey and the EU are analyzed Results show that
Turkey’ s PPF values will be lower, with respect to agriculture, when it joins the EU; however, EU trade liberalization benefits Turkey.

Uruguay Round Sonrası Türkiye’nin Avrupa Topluluğu’na Üyeliğinin Tarım Sektörüne Etkileri
Özet: Türkiye ve Avrupa Birliği (AB) arasındaki tarım politikaları Politik Tercih Fonksiyonu (PTF) kullanılarak incelenmiştir. Politika
yapıcıları tarafından algılanan üretici ve tüketicilerin sektördeki ağırlıklı oranları PTF kullanılarak hesaplanmış ve Türkiye’nin AB’ne
üyeliğinin tarımsal etkileri ve optimal stratejiler incelenmiştir. Sonuçlar Türkiye’nin birleşme olmadan izleyeceği çeşitli koruma
politikaları arasından statusko politikasını uygulmasanının tarım açısından birleşmeye göre daha iyi olacağını göstermektedir.
Türkiye’nin AB’ye katılımı durumundaki PTF değerleri birleşme öncesine göre daha düşük çıkmıştır, ancak birleşme durumunda
AB’nin ticaret politikasında liberalleşmeye gitmesi Türkiye’ye yarar sağlayacaktır.

Introduction
International trade negotiations in agriculture, such as
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) have
shown that agricultural trade policies carried out at the
international level are a consequence of domestic farm
policies. Because the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)
of the European Union (EU) has encouraged agricultural
production, surpluses have developed in recent years and
the EU has become a major exporter of several commodities (1). EU exports have steadily taken a greater
share of world agricultural trade, while for other major
agricultural exporters such as the United States (US),
agricultural exports to the EU have begun to decline as
well (2).
This situation has resulted in trade disputes in negotiations between the countries concerned. The US adopted
an extreme position in GATT, demanding complete elimination of all aid that had any impact on trade in agricultural products (3). Another important factor to consider
is that the European economic region will include additional countries. Applying in 1987 for full membership,
Turkey stated its eagerness to be part of this union (4).
The goal of this research is to examine agricultural
trade relations between Turkey and the EU. More specif-

ically, the possible entrance of Turkey into the EU and
trade relations between the EU are examined. This study
aims to obtain empirical evidence concerning the changes
in consumer and producer welfare due to the effects of
various policy actions of Turkey and the EU.
To accomplish these objectives, this study employs
the Modele International Simplifie de Simulation (MISS),
a partial equilibrium trade simulation model that simulates in a comparative static framework the effects of
various policy decisions (5). Once the model is initialized,
simulations that mirror the effects of the Uruguay Round
agricultural agreement arearried out. In addition, consumer, producer, and government budget weights are
estimated to reflect the net gains or losses to the
economies as viewed by policy-makers.
Theoretical Framework
The framework underlying this analysis is similar to
that used by Johnson et al. (6) and Kennedy et al. (7). In
this model, two countries and the rest of the world produce, consume and trade N commodities. Aggregate production, consumption, and trade in country i is described
by vectors of supply, demand, and excess demand. Farms
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Governments intervene in their domestic markets
through price instruments and supply/demand shift
instruments. Price instruments, denoted as Ap fn for producers and Ap cn for consumers of commodity n, affect the
farm and consumer prices of the N commodities.
Domestic producer and consumer prices are functions of
world prices (Pw), price instruments (Ap fi), and
supply/demand shift instruments (As ci).
In the selection of agricultural policies, governments
consider the effects of their policies on the welfare of various groups, namely, producers, consumers and taxpayers. Since agricultural policies often improve the welfare
of certain groups at other’s expense, governments must
weigh the welfare gains of one group against the welfare
losses of others. These trade-offs are represented by a
political payoff function (PPF), a weighted, additive function of producer quasi-rents, indirect utility of consumers,
and the budget costs of agricultural policies. In order to
simplify these expressions, let -i represent the other main
countries, and let Ai=(Afi, Aci)=(Ap fi, As fi, Ap ci, As ci).
Producers are aggregated by commodity group. The welfare of each producer group is the profit obtained from
the production and sale of the commodity.
Let the vector of producer quasi-rents be shown as a
function of government policies by
1. ∏i (Ai, A-i)=∏i (Pfi (Ap fi, Pw (Ai, A-i)), As fi).
The utility of the aggregate consumer group is
denoted as a function of government policies by
2. Ui (Ai, A-i)= Ui (Pci, (Ap ci, Pw (Ai, A-i)), As ci).
Similarly, the budget of government i is shown as a
function of the governments’ agricultural policies:
3. B (Ai, A-i) = Bi (Pfi (Ap fi, Pw(Ai, A-i)), Pci (Ap ci, Pw (Ai
, A-i)), Pw (Ai, A-i), As fi, Aci).
Finally, normalizing on the budget and using equations
1, 2, and 3, the PPF is:
4. Vi (Ai, A-i) =∏ (Ai, A-i) * λfi + U (Ai, A-i)*λci +B (Ai,
A-i),
where λfi is an N by one strictly positive vector and λci
is a positive scalar. (λfi, λci) are the political weights of
the respective commodity groups and the aggregate consumer group in country i.
Equation 4 explicitly links the policies of the governments with their objectives. What is lacking is a means
for the governments to select agricultural policies. In
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other words, subsequent determination of the production, consumption, and prices should be found. The following describes an equilibrium in which a government,
with the policies of the other countries given, selects a
policy to maximize its PPF. Formally, a best response correspondence is defined for each government. Then, the
equilibrium is defined using the best response correspondence. For a given A-i, government i chooses Ai*, a best
response to A-i, such that
5. Vi ( Ai *, A-i) ≥ Vi (Ai, A-i)

A

in country i produce some subset of the N traded commodities, taking prices, technology, and endowments as
given in order to maximize profit.

Ai ∈ Ai

where Ai is the set of actions (policies) available to
government i. Thus, every Ai, in A-i has a set of actions in
Ai that satisfy equation 5. The set defines the best
response correspondence of A-i. A pair of actions (Ai*, Ai*) is an equilibrium if it satisfies equation 5 for all i, that
is, Ai* is a best response to A-i * for all i. Differentiating
equation 4 with respect to Afi and Aci, the first order
necessary conditions for a maximum can be determined.
Empirical Analysis
1992 is the base year for the empirical analysis. Ten
commodity groups are distinguished; beef and veal, dairy
milk, corn, wheat, rice, soybeans, cotton, sugar, tobacco,
and pork and poultry. To initialize the model, protection
ratios are calculated for producers and consumers in
Turkey and the EU for the base year 1992. These protection ratios, combined with production and consumption levels, are used as a base from which all simulations
will be conducted. Nominal protection ratios were calculated by the ratio of domestic price to border price. Prices
were calculated in term s of commodity values for all
products. The necessary data to initialize the model were
obtained from various publications, such as the European
Commission (8) and FAO (9).
The PPF weights for Turkey and the EU are estimated through the evaluation of incremental changes in the
observed policies from their base levels. These changes
are then used as approximations of the partial derivatives
in first order conditions. Solving the first order conditions of equation 4 with respect to λfi and λci , the PPF
weights are obtained. These weights, normalized such
that the budget weight is one, are presented in Table 1.
According to these weights, in Turkey, rice, corn, dairy
milk and soybeans are high while in the EU, dairy milk,
wheat, soybeans, and beef and veal have a high level of
weights. The Turkish weights are all greater than one.
This indicates that the budgetary pressures experienced
by the EU have not been felt in Turkey to the same
degree. In addition, Turkish consumers rank higher than
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Table 1.

1992 Political Payoff Function Weights.

Products

Table 2.

Turkey
Rank

Turkey’s PPF Values for Alternative Protection Ratios without and with Integration ($ Million).

EU

Weight

Rank

EU

Weight

Beef and veal

7

1.10

4

1.21

Dairy milk

4

1.18

1

1.32

Corn

3

1.22

5

1.17

Wheat

10

1.02

2

1.25

Rice

1

1.77

6

1.07

Soybeans

4

1.18

3

1.22

Cotton

5

1.14

11

0.84

Sugar

6

1.13

8

1.02

Tobacco

9

1.07

10

0.91

Pork and poultry

8

1.09

7

1.06

Consumers

2

1.24

9

1.00

Source: Calculated.

all the sectors with the exception of rice. This implies that
Turkish policy makers place more importance on consumers, probably due to the level of per capita income.
In order to obtain Turkey’s PPF values, two scenarios
are considered. The first one considers that Turkey is outside the EU and has four actions; the status quo, GATT
protection reductions, a fifty-percent reduction from base
level protections, and free trade. When Turkey is considered within the EU, its protection rates in chosen agricultural products are adjusted with the EU such that they
are same as those of the EU. The EU has two actions; the
status quo and GATT commitments. Based on the calculated weights, Turkey’s PPF values without and with integration can be seen in Table 2.
As can be seen from Table 2, Turkey’s highest PPF
value is 15.01 when Turkey and the EU keep the status
quo. With the GATT reductions, Turkey’s PPF (6.23) is
positive although lower than the status quo option. When
the EU fulfils its GATT commitments, Turkey’s PPF values
are all negative with the highest negative value for free

Status Quo

GATT

Status Quo

15.01

-19.25

GATT Reductions

6.23

-27.01

Fifty Percent Reduction

-14.52

-47.85

Free Trade

-47.37

-85.56

-835.17

-562.09

Turkey

Without Integration

With Integration

Source: Calculated.

trade. When Turkey joins the EU, Turkey’s PPF values are
considerably lower. With integration, when the EU keeps
its status quo, Turkey’s PPF value (-835.17) is negative.
When the EU fulfils its GATT commitments, Turkey’s PPF
value (-562.09) is again negative but less than the EU
status quo scenario.
Conclusions
The results of this analysis suggest that it is better for
Turkey, from an agricultural standpoint, to keep the current protection ratios when it is separate from the EU.
When Turkey is in the EU, its PPF values decrease.
Joining the EU will bring Turkey an increased financial
burden in agriculture due to the higher producer prices
and budget cost. However, EU trade liberalization
decreases Turkey’s loss in agriculture with integration.
The results have several implications for Turkey. Turkey’s
loss in agriculture from joining the EU may be compensated for by the potential gains in the manufacturing and
service sectors as well as the EU’ s funding for various
sectors. Turkish policy-makers can evaluate these gains
and losses as they seek economic integration.
Comparisons of this type can be made in a similar framework to include the manufacturing and service sectors.
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